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Introduction: 
Possession of abundant oil reserves 
is often referred to as a “trap” or even a 
“curse” for developing countries.1 
Despite oil being one of the most valuable 
commodities in the world today, very few 
petro-states have been able to successfully 
convert large oil revenues into long-term 
national development.  In studying why so 
many oil-rich countries have been unable to 
bring about much needed economic and so-
cial development through large oil revenues, 
analysts noticed a pattern known as the 
petro-state curse that oil-rich countries are 
prone to follow.  Historically, numerous 
petro-states have fallen into this oil trap, 
including Iran in the 1970s2, Nigeria in the 
1980s, and Venezuela in the late 1980s3 and 
early 1990s.4  Large oil revenues are easily 
mismanaged and often lead to the two main 
components of the oil curse: “Dutch dis-
ease” and the “absorption” problem. 
Dutch disease refers to a common problem 
of resource-rich countries wherein a sudden 
increase in the value of a resource causes 
the value of the exporting country’s cur-
rency to increase in relation to other coun-
tries’ currencies.5Consequently, other sec-
tors become less profitable as non-oil ex-
ports become less competitive in global 
markets and as increased oil revenues bring 
in more imported goods.  The result of 
Dutch disease is, therefore, increased de-
pendency on oil and a significant decrease 
in economic diversification.  The 
“absorption” problem refers to the initial 
effect of an oil boom when large increases 
in revenue give petro-state administrations 
the impression that they can afford to fund 
multiple, capital-intensive policies and pro-
jects, such as large-scale development pro-
jects, military upgrades, social programs, 
and job creation.6 In addition, increased oil 
revenues often fuel corruption amongst gov-
ernment officials.  However, this grandiose 
spending limits the development of non-oil 
sectors of the economy while creating an 
overly large non-tradable sector.  Further-
more, the absorption problem leads petro-
states to spend too much money to fund im-
mediate projects and policies rather than 
saving or investing it in sustainable devel-
opment, such as improving oil infrastruc-
ture, thereby leaving them financially ill-
equipped to adapt to a sudden price drop. 
Unfortunately, under the leadership 
of President Hugo Chávez, it looks as 
though Venezuela is once again headed to-
ward suffering from economic and political 
instability as a result of his heavy spending 
throughout the oil boom of the 2000s.  
Chávez won the 1998 presidential election 
by appealing to Venezuela’s impoverished 
masses and by promising to replace the 
flawed Punto Fijo system with a new gov-
ernment and constitution based upon his 
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leftist ideology of equality.7 When 
he came into office in 1999, oil 
prices were low as each barrel sold for 
only about $10 per barrel (see Figure 1).  
Furthermore, during his first year as 
president, Venezuela’s economy was 
weak as a result of mismanagement of fi-
nances under the Punto Fijo system.  There-
fore, Chávez maintained good relations with 
the United States and other western powers 
to encourage investment in Venezuelan oil 
and continue the flow of foreign money into 
the economy. 
 However, oil prices soon began to 
rise and Chávez used that opportunity to 
consolidate control over Venezuela’s na-
tional oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela 
Sociedad Anónima (PdVSA), and to push 
foreign investors out so that the government 
could collect more revenues from the Vene-
zuelan oil industry.  Chávez took several 
steps toward taking over PdVSA by replac-
ing company employees with individuals 
who were loyal to him, most notably in 2002 
when he fired the then-president of PdVSA 
and attempted to change the company’s 
board of directors.8   His actions resulted in 
the temporary overthrow of Chávez in an 
April 2002 coup d’état attempt, as well as a 
strike at PdVSA, beginning in 2002 and end-
ing in 2003, which led to a decrease in 
Venezuela’s oil output that has yet to be re-
stored.9  However, Chávez used this oppor-
tunity to permanently install his supporters 
into essential PdVSA positions, thus con-
solidating his administration’s control over 
the company. 
With complete control over PdVSA, 
Chávez has also gained control over its reve-
nues, which he has used to fund an array of 
costly, large-scale policies and projects.  
Throughout the recent oil boom, he has com-
mitted billions of dollars, not only to domes-
tic development, but also to a series of ex-
pensive foreign policy initiatives throughout 
Latin America.  Analysis of Chávez’s re-
gional foreign policy reveals that it is waste-
ful in that these expensive initiatives fail to 
achieve his goals.  However, with unusually 
large oil revenues coming into Venezuela 
throughout this oil boom, Chávez was able 
to continue to fund his policies despite inef-
ficiencies.  Now that oil prices have de-
creased dramatically and suddenly, the flaws 
and the wasteful nature of Chávez’s foreign 
policy are likely to be exposed, once again 
leaving Venezuela susceptible to the petro-
state curse.  As a current example of a petro-
state that spent heavily throughout an oil 
boom and must now adjust to the subsequent 
oil bust, Venezuela under the leadership of 
Chávez serves as an interesting case study to 
test the effects of the petro-state curse and to 
predict what can be done to prevent eco-
nomic collapse in Venezuela. 
This paper will analyze Chávez’s use 
of Venezuelan oil revenues to fund his for-
eign policy in Latin America and the effects 
that the end of the oil boom is likely to have 
on his efforts.  The first section of the paper 
will discuss Chávez’s various initiatives in 
Latin America and analyze their success in 
accomplishing his main goals of establishing 
Venezuela as a strong regional power and 
diminishing western influence in the region.  
The next section will examine the implica-
tions that Chávez’s foreign policy has had in 
Latin America as his initiatives have contrib-
uted to both political and economic instabil-
ity in the region.  The third section of the 
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paper relates Chávez’s expensive 
foreign policy to the theory of the 
oil curse in order to determine 
whether his heavy spending is likely to 
lead Venezuela’s economy to fall vic-
tim to “Dutch disease” and the 
“absorption” problem or whether Chávez 
will be able to overcome these symptoms 
and navigate his country through the oil 
bust.  I predict that due to Chávez’s focus on 
funding costly agreements and projects 
rather than save high percentages of Vene-
zuelan oil revenues, Venezuela will only be 
able to avoid economic collapse for a short 
period of time unless oil prices rebound, 
thereby forcing Chávez to alter and elimi-
nate many of his regional policies and pro-
grams.  Finally, the conclusion builds upon 
the analysis of Chávez’s Latin American for-
eign policy to extract lessons from Chávez’s 
decisions and to establish general guidelines 
that should be kept in mind by petro-state 
leaders as they decide how to allocate oil 
revenues, particularly during oil booms 
when leaders are prone to a misleading sense 
of economic security. 
 
Foreign Policy in Latin America: 
 Chávez’s foreign policy in Latin 
America can best be described as a counter-
dependent foreign policy.  This type of for-
eign policy is exercised by leaders, like 
Chávez, who are fed up with their country’s 
dependence on other countries and, thus, 
want to minimize that dependence.10 To 
achieve his foreign policy goals, Chávez has 
used a combination of hard power, most of-
ten through the use of economic means to 
strongly influence the decisions of foreign 
governments, as well as soft power by pro-
moting his Bolivarian ideology throughout 
Latin America in order to attract support.11 
Using these tools, Venezuelan foreign policy 
throughout Chávez’s presidency has focused 
largely on providing development assistance 
and on fostering a sense of solidarity 
throughout the countries of South America, 
Central America, and the Caribbean.  
Chávez has developed numerous bilateral 
and multistate initiatives in Latin America 
aimed toward goals such as economic devel-
opment and energy security.  In recent years, 
promising billions of dollars in aid each 
year, Venezuela has surpassed the United 
States in the amount of direct aid provided 
throughout Latin America.12  By spending 
large amounts on development efforts 
throughout Latin America and establishing 
trade agreements on preferential terms with 
countries in the region, Chávez seeks to ful-
fill two main goals: to strengthen Vene-
zuela’s position in Latin America through 
the creation of alliances in the region and to 
minimize Latin American dependence on the 
West. 
Strengthening Venezuela’s Position in Latin 
America: 
One of Chávez’s major goals is to establish 
Venezuela as an influential regional power 
in Latin America.  Chávez seeks to spear-
head the spread of “twenty-first century so-
cialism” that he feels is an improved, more 
sustainable leftist agenda that will encourage 
equality in the region, though it is, thus far, 
an ill-defined concept.13  As such, in order to 
gain crucial support for his radical policies 
and ambitions in the region, Chávez has 
dedicated large portions of Venezuelan oil 
revenues to his efforts to form alliances with 
neighboring countries in Latin America.  In 
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addition to trying to gain the sup-
port of Latin American leaders, he 
tries to win over the support of Latin 
Americans through the use of public 
diplomacy, which can be defined as “a 
government’s diplomatic efforts that tar-
get citizens, the press, and other constituen-
cies in other countries rather than their gov-
ernments.”14 His economic and oil incen-
tives have earned him some support in Latin 
America for his regional ambitions, however 
he has only had limited success in achieving 
his goal of broadening his influence in Latin 
America.   
Chávez has used oil and its revenues 
to strengthen important alliances in the re-
gion, most notably with former Cuban Presi-
dent Fidel Castro and Bolivian President 
Evo Morales.  Cuba has arguably been 
Venezuela’s most important ally throughout 
Chávez’s presidency.  According to Max 
Azicri, the strong relationship that Chávez 
has cultivated between Venezuela and Cuba 
operates on three levels: Chávez and Castro 
have established a personal friendship, they 
have arranged for the exchange of goods and 
services, and they have joined together in the 
pursuit of common goals for Latin America 
in the name of the Bolivarian Revolution.15  
The personal friendship between the two 
leaders is very evident as it is often high-
lighted in the media.  However, it is the lat-
ter two exchanges that are of great interest to 
analysis of Chávez’s regional foreign policy. 
 First of all, each country is able to 
fill a void for the other, as Cuba needs to 
import about 100,000 barrels of oil daily and 
Venezuela requires individuals with special-
ized skills and services to fulfill Chávez’s 
plans for domestic social growth, which in-
clude educating Venezuela’s population and 
providing medical care to impoverished ar-
eas of the country.16 Therefore, in many 
ways, Venezuela receives immediate benefit 
through the Cuban-Venezuelan alliance that 
has been cultivated under Chávez.  Since 
Chávez came into power, there have been 
numerous exchanges between Venezuela 
and Cuba, beginning with the Cuban-
Venezuelan Petroleum Pact signed on Octo-
ber 30, 2000 stating that Venezuela would 
provide Cuba with 53,000 barrels of oil 
daily on preferential terms, and in turn re-
ceive services from Cuban doctors, sports 
trainers, and experts in a range of indus-
tries.17 The agreement also allowed Vene-
zuelans to travel to Cuba to receive training 
to become doctors or to receive free medical 
treatment.  The Barrio Adentro mission, a 
social program initiated by Chávez in April 
2003, builds upon this exchange of Cuban 
health professionals and medical supplies by 
extending free health care services to about 
seventeen million Venezuelans, many of 
whom had never received medical care prior 
to this program.18 By 2005, over twenty 
thousand Cuban doctors and health experts 
had relocated to Venezuela where they pro-
vided basic and even specialized health care 
to poor populations in needy neighbor-
hoods.19  In addition to medical exchanges, 
Venezuela and Cuba have reached a number 
of agreements throughout Chávez’s presi-
dency, including forty-nine agreements in 
2005 alone ranging from lowering tariffs to 
“the creation or improvement of rail infra-
structure in both countries.”20 
 In addition to the immediate benefit 
derived from close ties between Venezuela 
and Cuba, Chávez connects with Castro on 
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an ideological level.  According to 
Michael J. Bustamante and Julia E. 
Sweig of the Council on Foreign Re-
lations, Castro has served as a role 
model and a mentor to Chávez, as the 
two share similar socialist and anti-
hegemonic views.  On one hand, due to his 
ability to hold onto power despite Cold War 
pressures, numerous United States-backed 
assassination attempts, and years of eco-
nomic sanctions, Castro is in many ways 
symbolic of defiance against the United 
States, and Chávez is certainly well-aware 
that his alliance with Cuba contributes to 
unease amongst United States policymak-
ers.21 On the other hand, Castro, like Chávez, 
has focused much of Cuba’s foreign policy 
on public diplomacy, most notably by send-
ing Cuban doctors and health professionals 
to developing nations around the globe.  
Bustamante and Sweig claim that Castro has 
better mastered the ability to gain interna-
tional legitimacy through actions of public 
diplomacy.22          
If Bustamante and Sweig’s claim 
were accurate, then having the support of 
Castro could help Chávez gain the support 
and trust of some countries where he might 
otherwise have difficulties.  However, 
Chávez’s and Castro’s public diplomacy 
campaigns have not succeeded in winning 
over public support in Latin America.  Lati-
nobarómetro polls, which were conducted 
every year between 2005 and 2008, show 
that both Castro and Chávez are among the 
least popular world leaders as evaluated by 
pollsters in eighteen Latin American coun-
tries and Castro is, in fact, regarded more 
negatively than his Venezuelan counterpart 
(See Table 1).  Table 1 shows that not only 
were Castro and Chávez ranked similar to 
American President George W. Bush, as the 
three leaders comprise the bottom three 
world leaders every year except for 2008, 
but support for both Castro and Chávez has 
declined since Latinobarómetro began ask-
ing pollsters to evaluate a list of world lead-
ers.  Therefore, although Venezuela’s alli-
ance with Cuba may give Chávez legitimacy 
in some leftist countries, it is not helping 
him gain legitimacy and may even be hurt-
ing his image in Latin America. 
Chávez has also established close ties with 
Bolivia’s current president, Evo Morales.  
Morales, Bolivia’s first indigenous presi-
dent, is a leftist leader who also holds anti-
neoliberal and anti-United States views quite 
similar to those of Chávez.  During a visit 
Morales paid to Venezuela in 2006, Chávez 
“offered $30 million in assistance for social 
programs and pledged to supply Bolivia 
with 150,000 barrels of diesel fuel in ex-
change for agricultural products.” 23 Further-
more, Chávez promised to contribute $1.5 
million to a Bolivian social project that will 
broadcast a literacy program to rural areas 
via the radio, thereby promoting literacy 
among Bolivia’s poor indigenous popula-
tion.24 Morales has demonstrated his willing-
ness to stand by Chávez on many of his ac-
tions.  For example, in 2006, Morales joined 
the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas 
(ALBA), an agreement which will be dis-
cussed later, which was originally signed by 
Chávez and Castro in December 2004.25 The 
three leaders began calling their pact the 
“Axis of Good.”26 
 However, Bolivia may also be 
viewed as one example of how counterpro-
ductive Chávez’s anti-Western policy can 
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be.  Bolivia relies much more on 
foreign aid than Venezuela does, 
despite its large reserves of valuable 
natural gas.  Morales’ actions have con-
sequently been somewhat more re-
served than Chávez’s when it comes to 
attacking the United States.  Yet, in recent 
years, Morales has appeared to grow more 
confident in his alliance with Chávez and his 
commitment to extend aid and agreements to 
Bolivia.  For example, in 2006, Colombia 
was considering a free trade agreement with 
the United States that would have affected 
its importation of Bolivian soy.  Morales 
assured Bolivian soy producers that Vene-
zuela would purchase their soy, despite the 
fact that the Venezuelan market probably 
lacked the economic strength to import as 
much soy as Colombia did.27  With this in-
creased confidence, Morales has taken more 
of Chávez’s advice and adhered to his pro-
posed policies, for example, by nationalizing 
the hydrocarbon industry in Bolivia.  This 
decision alienated one of Bolivia’s most im-
portant trade partners, Brazil, which im-
ported about $700 million worth of Bolivian 
products at the time.28 It also impeded for-
eign investment which could have made Bo-
livia’s hydrocarbon industry more produc-
tive and more profitable.  Therefore, in the 
case of Bolivian nationalization of the hy-
drocarbon industry, Chávez’s advice hurt 
Bolivia which is rich in resources like natu-
ral gas, yet still lacks the means to maximize 
its economic return for these resources with-
out foreign investment. 
 Chávez can usually count on support 
from his close “Axis of Good” allies who 
have proven useful to an extent.  For exam-
ple, Morales stood alongside Chávez in 
threatening to withdraw from the Andean 
Community of Nations (CAN) if any of the 
other three Petroandina countries signed a 
free trade agreement with the United States. 
29 Yet the support of Chávez’s allies is often 
not enough to persuade neighboring coun-
tries to accept his proposed policies.  Despite 
their threat, all three of the countries contin-
ued free trade talks with the United States 
with both Peru and Colombia signing free 
trade agreements with the United States in 
2006.30 Chávez did follow through with his 
threat by withdrawing from CAN, however 
Bolivia, which is in a less secure financial 
position than Venezuela, remains a member 
of the organization.31 
 In 2006, Rafael Correa, a leftist who 
received his Ph. D in Economics in the 
United States, was elected president of Ec-
uador.  In many ways, his win represented a 
win for Chávez as well.  When Correa won 
the election, Chávez sent him a replica of 
Simon Bolívar’s sword as a sign of solidar-
ity and friendship.  Chávez also attended 
Correa’s swearing-in ceremony in January 
2007 where the new Ecuadorian president 
stated that his government was Bolivarian 
and he announced his support for Chávez’s 
notion of “twenty-first century socialism.”32  
Correa has taken several actions that reflect 
some of Chávez’s moves when he came into 
office.  For example, similar to Chávez who 
passed a referendum to approve his Boli-
varian Constitution in Venezuela, Correa 
passed a referendum shortly after being 
sworn in as president that proposed the crea-
tion of a national assembly to draft a new 
constitution in Ecuador.33 Furthermore, he 
opted not to renew an agreement with the 
United States that grants its forces the 
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to use Ecuador’s Manta air base in 
the American war on drugs, similar 
to Chávez who denied the United 
States use of Venezuelan territory for 
the same war.34  The two leaders have 
had a friendly relationship and they have 
seen eye to eye with each other on many 
issues.  Since Correa came to power, Vene-
zuela and Ecuador even negotiated a joint 
agreement to build a large refinery in Ecua-
dor.35  
 However, Correa is not as close an 
ally to Chávez as Cuba and Bolivia are as he 
has been much less radical in his actions.  
For example, although he set up an “excess 
profit tax” for foreign oil companies in Ec-
uador, he does not intend to nationalize the 
Ecuadorian oil industry as Chávez and Bo-
livia did with their hydrocarbon industries.36  
Furthermore, as will be discussed later, 
Chávez put Correa in an uncomfortable 
situation in 2008 after Colombia sent mili-
tary troops to attack a FARC camp on Ecua-
dorian territory.  In response to the action, 
Chávez sent Venezuelan troops to the border 
of Colombia, however his inflated response 
to the event that did not even occur in Vene-
zuela placed pressure on Correa to have a 
large response since the incursion had been 
onto his country’s territory.  As such, Correa 
also ordered Ecuadorian troops to go to the 
border of Colombia before all of the coun-
tries settled the dispute diplomatically.37      
Though he supports some of Chávez’s poli-
cies and ideas, Correa attempts to balance 
Ecuador’s relations with both Venezuela and 
the United States as many Latin American 
leaders choose to do. 
 President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 
of Brazil has also cooperated with Vene-
zuela quite a bit under Chávez.  When Lula 
won the 2002 presidential election in Brazil, 
Chávez hoped that the new president would 
work with him to resist neoliberalism in 
Latin America.  Chávez publicly expressed 
his support for Lula, extending his congratu-
lations as well as a replica of Simón 
Bolívar’s sword.38 Shortly after Lula’s vic-
tory in Brazil, Chávez requested that Lula 
send oil experts to Venezuela to assist in re-
suming oil production during the 2003 lock-
out of PdVSA, a request which Lula agreed 
to.  Lula’s decision to send Petrobrás spe-
cialists to Venezuela reflects not only Bra-
zil’s dependence at the time on Venezuelan 
oil imports to fulfill its national energy 
needs, but also Lula’s interest in Chávez’s 
idea of “regional energy self-sufficiency.”39 
Since then, in addition to building and im-
proving refineries together, the two countries 
have explored for oil near the coast of Vene-
zuela.  Chávez has offered about $273 mil-
lion toward funding the paving of a major 
highway and building a sports complex and 
civic center in Brazil.40     
 Despite Lula’s cooperation on sev-
eral issues and projects, the Brazilian presi-
dent has not stood unequivocally alongside 
Chávez.  For example, in 2004 after Haitian 
President Jean Bertrand Aristide was ousted 
from office, Chávez refused to officially rec-
ognize the newly-instated regime, whereas 
Lula sent troops to Haiti to protect the new 
administration.41Lula’s decision to recognize 
and protect the new government in Port-au-
Prince reflects Brazil’s desire to maintain 
good relations with the United States, which 
is a known opponent of Aristide and is often 
accused of involvement in the Haitian coup 
d’état.  Furthermore, the major discovery of 
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the Tupi oil field in Brazil in 2007 
may affect relations between Lula 
and Chávez.  The oil field is estimated 
to carry between five billion and eight 
billion barrels of oil which is enough to 
render Brazil self-sufficient in terms of 
energy.  Furthermore, Petrobrás believes it 
has discovered three more deep-water wells 
which, if proven to possess significant 
amounts of oil, could make Petrobrás an “oil 
giant,” comparable to PdVSA.42  These oil 
discoveries decrease Brazil’s dependence on 
Venezuela compared to 2003 when Vene-
zuelan oil imports were filling the gap in 
Brazilian energy needs.  As such, Lula has 
more autonomy to challenge Chávez’s poli-
cies and actions. 
The Caribbean is of particular inter-
est to Chávez in his quest for increased re-
gional influence as the countries that com-
prise the region carry particular weight in 
the Organization of American States (OAS).  
A 2007 article analyzing Venezuelan policy 
in the Caribbean notes the strategic impor-
tance of the region to Chávez: 
[Chávez] recognizes that Cari-
com countries represent almost half of 
the 34 votes in the OAS, where de-
bates on the hemispheric political 
situation are played out; and they are a 
solid bloc in the Latin American and 
Caribbean group at the UN.  If he 
could get them on his side, his poli-
cies could influence significantly the 
discourse of these bodies.43 
 
Indeed, when Chávez was seeking to 
win a United Nations Security Council seat 
for Venezuela in 2006, the Caricom nations, 
which comprise the majority of Petrocaribe 
(an agreement which will be discussed 
later), publicly lent their support to Vene-
zuela.44 On some levels, then, Chávez’s for-
eign policy has been successful in gaining 
support for his ambitions as demonstrated by 
his ability to gain the support of the Carib-
bean in his bid for a Security Council seat.  
However, Venezuela did not win the seat, 
which suggests that even where Chávez’s 
foreign policy decisions earn him some sup-
port, he is still unable to win over the sup-
port of crucial majorities to achieve many of 
his ambitions. 
Chávez seeks to acquire allies and 
rally support throughout Latin America in 
order to further his leftist goals and policies 
in the region.  Chávez is in pursuit of allies 
who share his ideologies and will implement 
policies similar to his, along with new trade 
partners to diversify Venezuelan markets.  
He has also mentioned the possibility of 
military alliances within Latin America.  To 
attract allies, Chávez has exploited Vene-
zuela’s large supply of oil and high revenues 
from the recent oil boom to carry out an ex-
tensive and very costly foreign policy that 
focuses on providing oil, money, and fund-
ing for development projects in neighboring 
countries.  Through his foreign policy, he 
has been able to earn conditional support 
from some countries and leaders in Latin 
America, however analysis shows that his 
efforts have been counterproductive in some 
countries in the region. 
 Chávez has also attempted to gain 
regional allies by publicly supporting politi-
cal candidates in national elections in 
neighboring countries.  Throughout 
Chávez’s presidency, there have been many 
accusations of him funding foreign  
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elections.  For example, he has 
been accused of financially backing 
Morales when he was a candidate in 
the 2002 Bolivian presidential elec-
tion.45 Chávez actively supported Sand-
inista candidate Daniel Ortega in the 
Nicaraguan presidential election of 2006 by 
providing subsidized oil to Sandinista politi-
cians to distribute throughout Nicaragua to 
help Ortega gain support.46  Whether or not 
Chávez’s oil shipments had an effect on the 
election outcome, Ortega, who Chávez so 
clearly supported, won the presidential elec-
tion and took office in 2007. 
 Yet Chávez’s efforts have not always 
been successful in influencing foreign elec-
tions in his favor.  In the 2006 Peruvian 
election, for example, his fervent support for 
leftist candidate Ollanta Humala, who many 
expected to win the election based on polls 
taken before the election, proved to be coun-
terproductive.47  A win for Humala would 
have been a key victory for Chávez because 
it would have given Venezuela strong influ-
ence in the Andean region.  Though he did 
not fulfill his rhetoric through action, 
Chávez went so far as to threaten to end 
Venezuela’s diplomatic ties with Peru if 
Alan Garcia became president.  Yet this 
threat did not stop the Peruvian population 
from electing Garcia as their new presi-
dent.48   In fact, many argue that support for 
Humala declined as a result of Chávez’s 
support, making Humala’s defeat a loss for 
Chávez as well.49 Therefore, it is clear that 
Chávez’s support for political candidates 
abroad has met with only limited success. 
Decreasing Dependence on the West: 
With hopes of challenging the current hege-
monic global structure, Chávez’s foreign 
policy throughout Latin America has fo-
cused largely on aid and agreements that are 
meant to minimize countries’ dependence on 
the West and on western-based international 
financial institutions (IFI).  Venezuela man-
aged to pay off its IFI debts five years early, 
completing the last of its debt payments to 
the World Bank in April 2007 and having 
already paid off its debts to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). 50 However, Latin 
America is not yet free from debt to western-
based IFIs as these institutions are still pro-
viding loans to countries in South America, 
Central America, and the Caribbean (see 
Figure 2).  Furthermore, in light of the 
global financial crisis, IFI loans taken out by 
Latin American countries increased, particu-
larly loans from western-based institutions 
like the World Bank, and IFI lending to the 
region is expected to continue to increase 
(see Figure 2).51  
In addition to debt, these countries 
often import resources and goods that they 
could potentially produce themselves given 
the vast natural resources that are found 
throughout Latin America.  This is largely 
because agricultural subsidies in western 
countries make western imports cheaper 
than domestic products.  As imports become 
cheaper than domestic products, a cycle is 
created that hurts Latin America: the devel-
opment of potential productive sectors is 
limited in Latin American countries because 
imports outcompete domestic products, 
causing dependence on the West.  However, 
if the price of imports increases, the sectors 
that could have produced the product are 
less equipped to fulfill the country’s needs, 
thereby forcing them to continue importing 
goods and perpetuating western  
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dependence.  Noting these two 
trends, one of the major goals 
Chávez seeks to address through his 
foreign policy in the region is to dimin-
ish dependence on the West and to 
make Latin America as self-sufficient as 
possible. 
 One of the ways Chávez has used 
increased oil revenues is by providing coun-
tries with the economic means to pay off 
part of their IFI debts.  Although estimates 
vary as to the exact amount Chávez has 
spent offering loans to and purchasing bonds 
from Latin American countries to permit 
them to settle their IFI debts, he has doubt-
lessly spent billions of dollars on these ef-
forts.  According to Terry Gibbs, Venezuela 
extended loans of $300 million to Ecuador 
and $500 million to Argentina to be used to 
pay back part of their IFI loans.52     In a 
more recent article, Michael Dodson and 
Manochehr Dorraj state that Chávez bought 
$3.5 billion worth of bonds that permitted 
Argentina to finish payments on its debt to 
the IMF.53  Amongst other countries to 
which Chávez has offered loans to pay back 
IFI debts is his close ally, Bolivia, to which 
he extended an offer of $1.5 billion.54 Offer-
ing this much money to pay these high IFI 
debts is extremely costly, however Chávez’s 
efforts have significantly limited the IMF’s 
presence in Latin America.  In February 
2007, Bloomberg reported that “IMF lending 
in the area has fallen to $50 million, or less 
than 1 percent of its global portfolio, com-
pared with 80 percent in 2005.”55In this way, 
Chávez’s policy has succeeded in diminish-
ing Latin American dependence on western-
based IFIs and, consequently, in limiting the 
ability of IFIs to exert influence over gov-
ernment policies in the region.  However, his 
policy does not eliminate debt.  By offering 
loans to Latin American countries to pay off 
their IFI debts essentially, Chávez is merely 
redirecting their indebtedness from multi-
state IFIs to one nation, Venezuela.  This 
redirection of debt may create new, and risk-
ier, dependence for impoverished Latin 
American countries, an issue which will be 
discussed in the following section. 
One of the major goals that Chávez 
stresses in his Bolivarian Revolution is the 
solidarity of Latin America in order to pro-
mote self-sufficiency in the region and to 
challenge Western dominance.  Chávez has 
come up with numerous ideas for integrating 
Latin America economically.  For example, 
one ambitious suggestion of Chávez’s is to 
create a Bank of the South that could pro-
vide loans to Latin American countries who 
need money rather than taking out a loan 
with the IMF and being forced to abide by 
its conditions.56 This proposal has yet to 
come to fruition, however Chávez has made 
some steps toward regional integration and 
self-sufficiency. 
 The Bolivarian Alternative for the 
Americas (ALBA) was proposed by Chávez 
as an alternative to neoliberalism that is 
based, instead, upon regional integration and 
unity.  Chávez feels that the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA), which was heavily 
encouraged by the Bush administration, 
would continue to serve the interests of mul-
tinational corporations, while doing little to 
promote national development and growth in 
the poorer countries of the hemisphere.57  
ALBA, on the other hand, is a multistate 
agreement intended to integrate Latin Amer-
ica by establishing a Compensatory Fund 
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that will be used to develop the 
poorer nations of the region in order 
to lessen economic disparity and 
strengthen the region.58  According to 
Chávez, this agreement encourages 
Latin American countries to “…integrate 
with an eye toward solving the problems 
we have in common… Together we can do 
so much more than anyone can do alone.”59  
ALBA, thus, focuses on region-wide issues 
such as combating poverty and marginaliza-
tion, endogenous development, and ending 
dependence on western-based institutions.60   
However, with one of the key premises of 
the proposal being a redistribution of wealth 
to the more impoverished countries of Latin 
America, it is of little surprise that the only 
countries that have shown enthusiastic sup-
port for the proposal are Chávez’s close al-
lies and poor, leftist countries, most notably 
Cuba, Bolivia, and Nicaragua.61   Although 
very few countries have signed onto ALBA 
thus far, Chávez bases much of Venezuela’s 
foreign policy on ALBA principles and he 
hopes that others will join his cause. 
 With large oil and gas reserves in 
Venezuela and several other Latin American 
countries possessing natural energy re-
sources, Chávez has seen more success in 
sparking cooperation between states through 
the promotion of regional energy integration.  
Between 2004 and 2005, Chávez signed 
three regional oil cooperation agreements: 
Petrosur, Petrocaribe, and Petroandina.  The 
most important of these agreements is Petro-
caribe, which was signed in June 2005 by 
fourteen Caribbean countries, including 
Cuba.62  With most of the countries in the 
Caribbean lacking oil reserves of their own, 
Chávez has committed Venezuela to provide 
the region with 198,000 barrels of oil 
daily.63 Petrocaribe aims to provide Carib-
bean countries with natural energy resources 
so that leaders can pursue development poli-
cies geared toward the needs of their popula-
tion.  Petrocaribe countries do not receive 
subsidized oil, but rather the agreement of-
fers them a type of loan wherein countries 
receiving oil shipments must pay sixty per-
cent of the bill within three months.  Then 
the remaining cost is to be paid over a period 
of approximately twenty years at an interest 
rate of one percent, or two percent if the 
price of oil falls below $50 per barrel.64  Oil 
shipments received through Petrocaribe can 
be exchanged for goods and services if 
countries are unable to pay with money.65   
Unlike the other two regional agreements, 
Petrocaribe set up a collection of savings 
meant to finance development programs and 
projects in the Petrocaribe states, known as 
the ALBA Caribe Fund.  According to the 
PdVSA website, Venezuela has donated 
$100 million to the ALBA Caribe Fund and 
nine Petrocaribe countries have already been 
able to draw from the fund to finance devel-
opment projects.66  Although PdVSA may 
be exaggerating the success of the ALBA 
Caribe Fund, there is no doubt that Petro-
caribe is the most elaborate and successful 
energy integration agreement that Chávez 
has established. 
 Petrosur and Petroandina are cur-
rently less developed than Petrocaribe and 
they have taken little meaningful action.  
Petrosur, developed in late 2004, was the 
first regional oil integration agreement to be 
signed in Latin America and it was signed 
by Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, and Uru-
guay.67   The Petroandina agreement was 
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signed in July 2005 by Bolivia, Co-
lombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Vene-
zuela. 68  The goal of these agree-
ments is to ensure that the signatories 
meet their energy needs by minimizing 
extra costs, extending preferential financ-
ing options, and permitting countries to pay 
for oil shipments through goods and ser-
vices.69 Thus far, the result of Petrosur and 
Petroandina has mostly been the discussion 
of potential projects rather than taking the 
necessary action to begin them.  For exam-
ple, through Petroandina, Ecuador is work-
ing on negotiations to send some of its crude 
oil to be refined in Venezuela, an arrange-
ment that could save the country part of the 
$1 billion it spends annually on importing 
fuel, but the project has yet to begin.70   
 Chávez hopes that one day these 
three regional energy cooperation agree-
ments will merge into one large entity 
known as PetroAmérica.  Firstly, Chávez 
envisions that this agreement will include 
the distribution of energy as the three re-
gional agreements already aim to achieve.  
Secondly, he hopes that PetroAmérica will 
facilitate large-scale infrastructure projects 
such as a gas pipeline that would run more 
than half the length of South America from 
Venezuela’s northern coast to Argentina.71 
Finally, Chávez hopes that this integration 
agreement will make Latin America self-
sufficient with more resources than just en-
ergy.  For example, he wants Venezuela and 
Colombia to produce wood pulp regionally 
to make paper rather than being forced to 
spend the extra money to import wood pulp 
from abroad.72 The implementation of this 
agreement would help to shift the global 
structure away from the current hegemonic 
global structure, making Latin America a 
largely self-sufficient region and, conse-
quently, limiting the amount of influence 
western powers could exert over regional 
affairs.  However, with the oil boom over 
and global recession setting in, it is doubtful 
that Chávez will have the resources to set up 
and gain support for PetroAmérica in the 
near future. 
Even if Chávez were able to success-
fully set up PetroAmerica, it is unlikely that 
the agreement would be able to succeed in 
the long-term.  First of all, the construction 
of pipelines and other equipment would be 
extremely expensive just to launch this con-
tinent-wide energy integration.  It could very 
quickly drain Latin American resources and 
drive countries in the region further into 
debt.  Furthermore, leaving oil fields open to 
foreign investment would be wiser than es-
tablishing government control over all of 
Latin America’s hydrocarbons, as experi-
enced foreign oil companies have proven to 
be most able to keep oil production at its 
maximum level.  After Chávez consolidated 
government control of PdVSA following the 
2003 strike, oil production in Venezuela has 
decreased significantly from about 3.5 mil-
lion barrels per day in 1997 to about 2.7 mil-
lion barrels in 2007 (see Figure 3).  Finally, 
trying to become a self-sufficient continent 
would severely limit the system’s long-term 
sustainability.  International trade allows 
countries to specialize in the production of 
certain products and then trade with other 
countries to obtain any other goods that they 
require.  Limiting trade to Latin America 
would decrease efficiency in the region since 
other countries may be able to produce 
goods at a lower cost, making products 
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cheaper for Latin American con-
sumers.  It would also throw off the 
market balance, as regional demand is 
likely to be limited for a given product, 
but internationally there will probably 
be large, profitable markets with high de-
mand. 
Effectiveness of Chávez’s Policies in Achiev-
ing his Goals: 
Although counterdependent foreign 
policies may meet with success in some in-
stances, they often fail to achieve their goals 
as these strategies often anger more power-
ful states and, consequently, alienate the 
country.73    Furthermore, much of Chávez’s 
foreign policy is based on economic incen-
tives which sometimes produce a desired 
outcome, however they are a “less precise 
instrument” for state leaders.74  In other 
words, the recipient of economic incentives 
does not always take the action that the pro-
vider of economic incentives wants them to 
take.  As such, analysis of Chávez’s policies 
reveals that his regional foreign policy has 
been unsuccessful in reaching his goals of 
establishing Venezuela as a major regional 
power and minimizing Latin Americaan de-
pendence on the West.   
First of all, he has been unsuccessful 
in his attempt to strengthen Venezuela’s po-
sition in Latin America, largely due to his 
inability to establish strong alliances in the 
region.75   His strong relationship with Cuba 
brings some direct benefit to Venezuelans in 
the form of quality medical care, but this 
exchange of medical services for oil is very 
costly and arguably brings more benefit to 
Cuba than to Venezuela.  Most other Latin 
American leaders, such as Lula, are pursuing 
a delicate balance between relations with 
Venezuela and with the United States.  Even 
countries with left-wing leaders such as Bo-
livia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua lack the finan-
cial strength to stand unfalteringly with 
Chávez in all of his policies. Some of 
Chávez’s attempts to gain allies in the region 
have outright backfired as in the case of Hu-
mala’s defeat in the Peruvian election.  As 
such, Chávez’s attempts to build alliances 
have brought him only conditional support 
as most Latin American leaders prefer to 
weigh the benefits and the risks of support-
ing Chávez. 
This lack of reliable support has 
largely inhibited Chávez from spreading his 
policies and furthering his goal of making 
Venezuela a major regional power.  Al-
though he has won the support of some 
countries on certain issues, he has still had 
trouble gaining enough support to achieve 
his many ambitions, such as winning a 
United Nations Security Council seat.  Fur-
thermore, Chávez is not well-received by 
Latin Americans who do not hold positions 
of power as demonstrated by the fact that he 
was ranked one of the worst world leaders 
according to a Latinobarómetro poll taken in 
2008 (see Table 1).  There is little doubt that 
Chávez’s involvement in the domestic af-
fairs of other countries is a major factor in 
this aversion to Chávez.  Failing to receive 
widespread support from both Latin Ameri-
can government officials and Latin Ameri-
cans, many of Chávez’s policies have been 
ineffective or counterproductive.  Therefore, 
by involving himself in other countries’ af-
fairs and by offering countries incentives, 
Chávez has failed to make his country a re-
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Furthermore, he has not succeeded 
in ending Latin American depend-
ence on the West.  Although he may 
have minimized some individual coun-
tries’ debts to western-based IFIs, he 
has not eliminated Latin America’s de-
pendence on the West.  The West, particu-
larly the United States, maintains a strong 
presence in the region and even though the 
country is not popular amongst Latin Ameri-
cans (see Table 1), they are forced to accept 
their need for Western-based assistance pro-
grams.  As such, most countries in the re-
gion are not even interested in ending rela-
tions with the United States.  In addition, 
two of the three regional energy agreements 
that Venezuela has signed have prompted 
very little action.  Latin America is, there-
fore, still dependent on the western govern-
ments, non-governmental organizations, and 
western-based multi-state organizations such 
as the IMF. 
As Chávez’s goals of strengthening 
Venezuela and minimizing western influ-
ence in Latin America have had only limited 
success, there are now two separate forces 
working in Latin America.  On one hand, the 
neoliberal model is promoted by numerous 
Latin American countries, such as Mexico, 
and also by the United States which main-
tains a strong presence in the region.  On the 
other hand, Chávez encourages the adoption 
of his Bolivarian model by his Latin Ameri-
can neighbors.  These two clashing models 
have led to much controversy throughout 
Latin America as support for neoliberal and 
socialist models varies as leaders support 
policies that they expect to be in their best 
interest at the time.  The next section will, 
thus, analyze the conflicts and the instability 
that has arisen as a result of Chávez’s poli-
cies in the region. 
Implications of Chávez’s Policy through-
out Latin America: 
Analysis of Chávez’s foreign policy 
decisions and their effects throughout Latin 
America shows that his policies are not in 
the best interest of countries in the region or 
of Latin America as a whole.  As discussed 
in the previous section, Chávez has had only 
limited success in accomplishing his goals 
of strengthening Venezuela’s role in the re-
gion and minimizing regional dependence 
on the West.  First of all, many countries are 
beginning to distance themselves from 
Chávez due to waning support for him in the 
region and a pragmatic understanding of the 
continued necessity to cooperate with the 
West.76  Chávez’s strong attitudes and rheto-
ric are even contributing to conflict in the 
region, despite increased economic and tech-
nological cooperation.  Furthermore, the 
similarities of Chávez’s development poli-
cies to Latin America’s failed experiment of 
import-substituting industrialization (ISI) 
pose a great threat to the stability of the re-
gion.  Chávez’s foreign policies, therefore, 
are not unifying Latin America meaning-
fully, but rather they are contributing both to 
political and economic instability in the re-
gion. 
Political Instability Resulting from Chávez’s 
Foreign Policy: 
Chávez has become a controversial 
figure both regionally and internationally.  
This is largely due to his aggressive rhetoric 
against those who disagree with him, com-
bined with the hasty decisions he has been 
known to make and retract.  As Table 1 
shows, Latin American opinions of Chávez 
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between 2005 and 2008 decreased 
more overall than any other world 
leader that Latinobarómetro polled 
individuals about, with the exception of 
George W. Bush.  These statistics sug-
gest that Chávez is not the highly es-
teemed leader that he hopes to be in Latin 
America.  As Chávez and Bush became two 
of the most negatively perceived leaders ac-
cording to Latin Americans and two of the 
most prominent figures in the region, there 
emerged a major divide in Latin America 
over their policies and influence.  As such, 
Chávez’s policies have not been well re-
ceived across all of Latin America and pol-
icy differences have led to political conflicts 
within the region rather than facilitating the 
regional integration and cooperation that 
Chávez wishes to see. 
 First of all, support for Chávez has, 
in many ways, become a “liability for politi-
cians in Latin America,” meaning that politi-
cians who have connections to Chávez may 
now run the risk of losing the support of 
their populace.77Indeed, as previously dis-
cussed, this was the case in the 2006 Peru-
vian elections when Chávez publicly backed 
Humala who then lost the election, in part as 
a result of Chávez’s support.  Despite the 
economic catastrophe that Alan Garcia was 
remembered for from his first presidential 
term between 1985 and 1990, his slogan of 
“Peru or Chávez” attracted many in the 
population who were against Chávez’s in-
volvement in Peruvian affairs.78   In other 
Latin American countries, exposing and ac-
cusing politicians of having ties to Chávez 
has become a tactic used by candidates to 
defeat the opposition in elections.  In the 
Nicaraguan election of 2006, although Or-
tega ultimately won the election, his oppo-
nent used Chávez’s shipments of oil to 
Sandinista leaders as a tactic to criticize Or-
tega’s supporters.79 Even in Mexico’s 2006 
election, presidential candidate Felipe Cal-
derón accused his opponent Andrés Manuel 
López Obrador of having ties to Chávez, an 
accusation that Obrador denied. 80Following 
Calderón’s ad campaign, Obrador lost his 
lead in the polls and Calderón won the elec-
tion by a margin of less than one percent.81 
Chávez’s involvement in numerous 
national elections in 2006 may help to ex-
plain why approval ratings among Latin 
Americans suddenly dropped from an aver-
age of 4.9 on a scale of 10 to 4.5, as shown 
in Table 1.  The trend in both Peru and Mex-
ico of support for the leftist candidate shift-
ing to their opponent following accusations 
of political ties to Chávez clearly demon-
strates that significant percentages of the 
Latin American population are against 
Chávez’s involvement in domestic affairs.  
For support of leading candidates to decline 
so definitively following Chávez’s backing 
for leftist candidates, the threat of his influ-
ence must have been perceived as a more 
important concern for a significant portion 
of voters than other domestic issues that 
were guiding their decision in earlier polls.  
It is very likely, then, that Chávez’s interfer-
ence in the domestic affairs of other coun-
tries contributed to this large drop in Latin 
American opinion of the Venezuelan presi-
dent. 
 In addition, tensions arose in Latin 
America as a result of Morales’ 2006 deci-
sion to nationalize the hydrocarbon industry 
in Bolivia, and frustration was once again 
felt toward Chávez who supported Morales’ 
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decision and offered him advice on 
carrying it out.82Argentine-Spanish 
company Repsol YPF and Brazil’s 
state oil company Petrobrás were both 
heavily invested in Bolivia’s hydrocar-
bon industry and, therefore, were nega-
tively impacted by the nationalization of 
Bolivia’s hydrocarbon industry.  Argentina, 
which imported significantly less oil than 
Brazil, was able to strike a deal with Bolivia 
rather quickly by agreeing in 2006 to pay $5 
per billion BTU as compared to the $3.18 it 
paid before Bolivian nationalization.83Brazil, 
on the other hand, was much more invested 
in the Bolivian hydrocarbon industry with 
more than 50% of Brazilian gas and 75% of 
gas consumption in São Paulo being im-
ported from Bolivia.84 Lula spoke very dip-
lomatically of Morales’ decision to national-
ize Bolivia’s gas reserves, however he re-
fused to meet with Morales to negotiate aug-
mented gas prices.  It was not until October 
28, 2006, after Lula developed a firmer 
stance in favor of Brazilian national interest, 
that Brazil and Bolivia reached a deal that 
would allow Petrobrás to continue its opera-
tions in two Bolivian gas fields.85       
Although Lula has remained diplo-
matic in his relations with Venezuela, some 
analysts believe that Brazil began loosening 
its ties to Chávez in light of Bolivian nation-
alization of gas reserves which was encour-
aged by Chávez.  It is important to note that, 
as discussed in the previous section, Lula 
was never an absolute supporter of Chávez’s 
policies.  That being said, Brazil’s support 
for some of Chávez’s policies that it had 
once supported has waned even more in re-
cent years.  For example, following the hy-
drocarbon conflict, Petrobrás officials 
sounded less enthusiastic about plans to 
build the $20 billion pipeline that Chávez 
envisions and that would begin in Vene-
zuela, traverse Brazil, and end in Argen-
tina.86 More explicitly, the Brazilian press 
criticized Chávez for his involvement in en-
couraging and assisting Bolivia to national-
ize its hydrocarbon industry. 
One country with which Chávez has 
had particularly rocky relations is its 
neighbor to the west, Colombia, though 
Chávez has periodically shown signs of 
wanting to cooperate with its neighbor.  
Prior to Chávez’s taking office, Colombia 
and Venezuela, under the administrations of 
former presidents Carlos Andrés Pérez and 
Rafael Caldera, followed a policy of 
“degulfisation,” meaning that the two coun-
tries focused on pursuing trade relations and 
downplayed political tensions, such as terri-
torial disputes.87 However, throughout 
Chávez’s presidency, relations with Colom-
bia (which is known to have close ties to the 
United States) have been dynamic, alternat-
ing between pragmatic cooperation between 
the two countries and Chávez’s use of ag-
gressive rhetoric and actions toward Colom-
bia. 
 When Chávez first came to power in 
1999, he experienced good relations with 
then-Colombian President Andrés Pastrana 
as the two leaders worked together to ad-
dress issues surrounding the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a leftist 
guerilla group in Colombia to which Chávez 
is sympathetic.88 However, their relations 
quickly worsened, particularly after Pastrana 
adopted Plan Colombia, a plan wherein Co-
lombia receives $1.3 billion from the United 
States to train its military to eliminate drug 
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trafficking.89  Chávez opposes Plan 
Colombia, believing that this drug 
eradication plan wrongfully targets 
the livelihood of Latin American coca 
farmers rather than Western drug abus-
ers.  In 2002, having recently been re-
stored to power following the short-lived 
coup d’état that temporarily ousted the 
Venezuelan president, Chávez showed a 
more cooperative attitude toward Colombia 
as its current President Álvaro Uribe Vélez 
took office.  However, relations between the 
two countries worsened, once again, and 
have remained poor due to policy differ-
ences. 
 Relations between Venezuela and 
Colombia came closest to a military con-
frontation in 2007 when Uribe ordered Co-
lombian military troops to attack a FARC 
camp on Ecuadorean territory.    Chávez re-
sponded to this by “closing the Venezuelan 
embassy in Bogotá, expelling the Colombian 
ambassador in Caracas, sending 10 battal-
ions of troops to the border with Colombia 
and threatening to deploy Russian fighter 
bombers.”90  As previously mentioned, 
Chávez’s exaggerated response to the incur-
sion into Ecuador pressured Correa into 
sending troops of his own to the Colombian 
border.  Chávez’s response was criticized 
regionally and internationally.  Even Castro 
and Lula, who have enjoyed good relations 
with Chávez in many situations, discouraged 
the prospect of war between Colombia and 
Venezuela.  Chávez quickly called back 
Venezuelan troops, however his rash deci-
sion to mobilize his troops over an incident 
that did not even occur on Venezuelan terri-
tory demonstrates how Chávez’s actions of-
ten create controversy and could even lead 
to military conflicts.  Although Chávez and 
Uribe agreed to meet to reestablish diplo-
matic ties following the conflict, tensions 
between Venezuela and Colombia remain.91 
 Another major political concern 
within Latin America is that Chávez may be 
starting a regional arms race.  In 2006, 
Venezuela struck a major arms deal with 
Russia by purchasing assault rifles, fighter 
jets, and helicopters for the price of nearly 
$3 billion.92  Since then, Chávez has struck 
even more weapons deals with Russia, as 
well as with Brazil, Belarus, China, and 
Spain.  Chávez maintains that these pur-
chases are merely intended to update Vene-
zuela’s outdated arsenal, however there have 
been implications that these arms deals were 
a response to the United States’ arming Co-
lombia through Plan Colombia and the sub-
sequent Patriot Plan.93 Since then, several 
other Latin American countries have begun 
to significantly increase military spending.  
Lula, for example, requested that the Brazil-
ian Congress set aside about $5.6 billion to-
ward the countries 2008 military budget.94     
Chile’s military expenditures are also note-
worthy, spending about 3.8 percent of its 
GDP on national defense.95 Some countries 
have expressed concern over these increases 
in military spending throughout the region, 
for example, Peru feels threatened by 
Chile’s heavy investment in its military due 
to a border dispute between the two coun-
tries.96 As more Latin American leaders feel 
threatened by the level of military spending 
in surrounding countries, it is very plausible 
an arms race will escalate in the region, 
thereby causing more instability and divide 
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The Path to Economic Instability: 
Chávez wants integration of Latin 
America to occur under his terms and 
according to his Bolivarian ideology, 
however his plan for the economic inte-
gration of Latin America resembles the 
failed policy of import-substituting industri-
alization (ISI).  ISI is a policy that provides 
an alternative to capitalism and was tested in 
Latin America beginning in 1930 and ulti-
mately failing by the early 1980s.97 The 
book Modern Latin America describes the 
theory behind ISI growth: 
In contrast to the largely lais-
sez-faire policies of nineteenth-
century England and the United 
States, Latin American governments 
actively promoted industrial growth.  
They did so in various ways: erecting 
tariff barriers and raising the price of 
imported goods to the point where 
local industrial firms could success-
fully compete in the marketplace; 
creating demand by favoring local 
producers in government contracts 
(involving, for example, purchases 
for the military); and, most impor-
tant, establishing government-run 
companies and investing directly in 
industrial firms.  Through protection 
and participation, the state in Latin 
America furnished critical impetus 
for the regions industrial growth.98 
 
ISI failed during this period in Latin Amer-
ica due to three key shortcomings.  First of 
all, it failed to eliminate foreign dependence 
in Latin American countries.  Latin Ameri-
can countries hoped to become self-
sufficient through industrialization and 
manufacturing their own goods.  However, 
rather than make Latin America self-
sufficient, it made these countries dependent 
on the West for expensive goods, such as 
machinery to manufacture products, rather 
than the finished products themselves.99  
Next, ISI limited local demand for manufac-
tured products as they were manufacturing 
industrial goods, such as refrigerators.  
Many locals could not afford such goods 
and, given the nature of the products, those 
who could afford them did not need large 
quantities.  Furthermore, there was little 
trade between countries so companies were 
forced to accept market demand within their 
country.100 Finally, the use of advanced tech-
nologies limited job production as they re-
placed much manual labor.  With machines 
performing tasks that could have otherwise 
been done by humans, unemployment rates 
increased and few people could afford to 
buy the finished products.101 
Chávez is encouraging Latin Amer-
ica to become self-sufficient by promoting 
the integration and solidarity of the region.  
Chávez’s policy of regional integration re-
sembles ISI in that it encourages national 
development by giving preference to local 
products over foreign imports. 102          
However, Chávez claims that the key differ-
ence between ISI and his policy is that the 
latter focuses on sovereignty and the individ-
ual needs of a specific country.103 His policy 
of endogenous development is not intended 
to stop all trade as Chávez relies on oil reve-
nues to carry out his domestic and foreign 
policies.  Yet as previously discussed, he 
wants Latin American dependence on the 
West to be as minimal as possible.  Despite 
Chávez’s belief that Latin American  
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integration and endogenous growth 
will promote sustainable develop-
ment in the region, analysis of 
Chávez’s foreign policy suggest that 
countries that become too closely en-
twined in Chávez’s economic and devel-
opment plans will be susceptible to one of 
the shortcomings of Latin America’s twenti-
eth-century experiment with ISI, which is its 
failure to eliminate dependence on the West.   
As mentioned in the previous sec-
tion, Chávez’s attempts to minimize Latin 
American dependence on the West only re-
direct Latin America’s foreign dependence.  
One major problem with ISI growth in twen-
tieth century Latin America is that in order 
to industrialize, these countries had to pur-
chase products such as technology and in-
dustrial equipment from the West, thereby 
altering the goods that Latin America was 
dependent on importing.104 As Chávez has 
flexed his power in Latin America through 
oil diplomacy, he has already begun to make 
Latin American countries dependent on 
Venezuela.  For example, in recent years, 
Morales has shown signs of “drifting away 
from Washington’s orbit” as his close rela-
tions with Chávez have provided Bolivia 
with aid and support from Venezuela.  How-
ever, if Chávez cannot afford to continue to 
help Bolivia financially, Bolivia will be in a 
precarious situation.  The Petrocaribe coun-
tries would be particularly susceptible to in-
stability if Chávez were forced to abandon 
his foreign policy in the region as Venezuela 
is now the primary energy supplier in the 
Caribbean.  Prior to Petrocaribe, Trinidad 
and Tobago was the primary provider of en-
ergy in the Caribbean, however they allowed 
for Venezuela to step into that role.  Despite 
the decision to permit Venezuela to replace 
Trinidad and Tobago as primary energy sup-
plier of the region, Prime Minister Patrick 
Manning has made it clear that his country 
would sell their oil in new markets and be 
unable to fill the regional energy void if for 
any reason there were to be a disruption in 
oil supply.105 If decreasing oil revenues and 
rising debt force Venezuela to alter its pol-
icy, the Petrocaribe nations will have few 
back-up options. 
The new dependence that Chávez’s 
foreign policy creates is potentially more 
worrisome than dependence on IFIs because 
rather than multiple countries contributing to 
loans, Venezuela is the sole country respon-
sible for many of the loans Chávez has pro-
vided in recent years.  First of all, this cre-
ates dependence on Chávez’s decision to 
continue any agreements that are reached for 
Latin American countries that accept 
Chávez’s loan and trade offers.  Chávez can 
use loans that Venezuela provides unilater-
ally as a form of hard power to coerce loan 
recipients to abide by certain conditions.  
Chávez has persistently criticized IFIs for 
using loans as a means of hard power to co-
erce developing world governments to adopt 
mandatory conditions in order to receive 
loans.  However, there is a good chance that 
Chávez will use Venezuelan loans in this 
way if he believes it will further his goals.  
Furthermore, Chávez’s foreign policy in the 
region renders Latin American countries de-
pendent upon his ability to perpetuate the 
numerous and costly agreements that he has 
reached.  IFIs like the IMF and the World 
Bank are institutions that draw funds from 
multiple states, therefore if one contributing 
state runs into financial trouble, money will 
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still be available due to the finan-
cial contributions of other states.  
With Venezuela as the sole lender, 
loan recipients become dependent on 
the economic and political stability of 
Venezuela.  This dependence is particu-
larly problematic for many Latin American 
countries because oil prices vary greatly and 
are unpredictable, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
The biggest danger for Latin Amer-
ica is the fact that all of the agreements and 
projects that Chávez has committed to are 
dependent on high revenues from one natu-
ral resource, oil, of which the value is diffi-
cult to predict.  Figure 1 shows that through-
out most of Chávez’s presidency, he has 
benefited from significant increases in the 
price of oil, with prices rising from as low as 
$8.85 per barrel in December 1998 to a peak 
of $137.98 per barrel in July 2008.  Since 
then, prices fell as low as $32.06 per barrel 
on December 26, 2008 and, in recent weeks, 
they have been hovering at about $50 per 
barrel.106 With so much of Venezuela’s oil 
revenues going toward advancing Chávez’s 
political agenda as opposed to investment in 
Venezuelan oil infrastructure, PdVSA’s oil 
production is not as high as it could be (see 
Figure 3) and the addition of decreased de-
mand in the context of the global crisis will 
drive Venezuela toward unsustainable debt.  
With the oil boom ending and global reces-
sion setting in, Chávez will be forced to 
make many changes to his policies through-
out the region, which is likely to have nega-





The Effects of Falling Oil Prices on 
Chávez’s Foreign Policy: 
 Although Chávez has, thus far, been 
able to use high oil revenues to fund his for-
eign policy, analysis of his policies and pro-
grams reveals that, with Venezuelan oil 
prices hovering at about $40 per barrel, he, 
too, may be headed toward the downward 
slope of the petro-state trap.  However, de-
spite his strong rhetoric, he has proven 
throughout his presidency to be a rational 
politician and to have a pragmatic side in 
making his decisions.  In January 2009, in 
light of the decrease in oil prices, Chávez 
allowed Western oil companies to make bids 
on Venezuelan oil fields. 107 Furthermore, in 
March 2009, he announced plans to revise 
Venezuela’s 2009 budget, basing it upon oil 
prices of $40 per barrel rather than the $60 
per barrel that it was originally figured 
around. 108 By taking the proper actions to 
adjust to decreased oil prices and by manag-
ing Venezuela’s international reserve sav-
ings of $42.2 billion wisely, Chávez may be 
able to resist Venezuela’s succumbing to the 
oil curse this year.  However, if oil prices do 
not continue to rise, budget cuts will be nec-
essary that are likely to have negative rami-
fications both for Venezuela and for 
neighboring countries in Latin America.109 
Venezuela, Chávez, and the Oil Curse: 
 When analyzing how Chávez’s poli-
cies are being affected by the oil bust, it is 
helpful to consider the policy weaknesses of 
the Punto Fijo system or puntifijismo, which 
was the political system that preceded 
Chávez.  The Pact of Punto Fijo was a 
power-sharing agreement signed in 1958 
which was said to protect democracy in 
Venezuela by respecting elections.110  
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Elected officials were to work with 
members of the other political par-
ties that signed the pact and consider 
differing viewpoints in forming govern-
ment policy.  In practice, this agreement 
limited political power to the two main 
political parties of Venezuela, Acción De-
mocratica (AD) and COPEI, intentionally 
shutting the Communist Party out of the po-
litical system.111  The system was strong in 
Venezuela for about thirty years until eco-
nomic and political instability ensued in the 
1980s, largely as a result of the end of the oil 
boom.  Puntofijismo officially ended in 1999 
when Chávez took power and created his 
Bolivarian Constitution.112 
 The downfall of the Punto Fijo sys-
tem can be primarily attributed to the effects 
of the oil curse.  For about a quarter of a 
century, oil wealth masked many of the 
flaws of puntofijismo, however when oil 
prices plunged in the 1980s, the trends of the 
oil curse began to appear, thereby exposing 
the weaknesses of the system and paving the 
way for political instability.113  Chávez took 
advantage of this instability by rallying sup-
port among the poor and working classes 
and promising to overturn the Punto Fijo 
system, which ultimately led him to win the 
1998 Venezuelan election.114  Yet, despite 
Chávez’s rhetoric about creating a better po-
litical system in Venezuela, analysis of his 
economic policy reveals that he, too, may be 
headed toward the two main destabilizing 
trends of the petro-state curse by replicating 
several fundamental weaknesses of the 
Punto Fijo system.  To prevent an economic 
collapse through this indefinite period of 
decreased oil value, Chávez must attempt to 
diversify his government’s sources of reve-
nue and cut down on unnecessary expendi-
tures. 
 First of all, as a major oil exporter, 
Dutch disease has been a constant concern 
for Venezuela.  Under the Punto Fijo sys-
tem, Venezuela enjoyed two oil booms be-
tween 1960 and 1980 that contributed to 
rapid economic growth, a higher quality of 
life compared to the rest of Latin America 
(as measured by health, education, and 
wages), and, consequently, political stabil-
ity.115 The government was dependent on oil 
revenues as the high value of the Venezue-
lan bolívar with relation to other countries 
suppressed non-oil production sectors within 
Venezuela.  As such, when oil prices 
plunged in the 1980s, the Venezuelan gov-
ernment could not fall back upon other 
sources of export revenue, forcing it to take 
out foreign loans and artificially control its 
currency, which ultimately caused the pro-
gress that had been made during the oil 
booms to regress.116 
 Dutch disease has continued to have 
an adverse effect on the non-oil sector under 
Chávez’s leadership as his policies also rely 
almost entirely on oil revenues to finance his 
policies.  As was the case under puntofi-
jismo, Venezuela’s non-oil sectors have been 
unable to develop because large oil revenues 
strengthened the value of the bolívar with 
relation to other currencies, making imports 
cheaper and lowering the competitiveness of 
Venezuelan products.  Analysis of the export 
and import rows in Table 2 illustrates the 
escalating problem of Dutch disease in 
Venezuela between 1998 and 2007.  As oil 
revenues increased following the end of the 
2003 PdVSA strike, the value of goods be-
ing imported into Venezuela skyrocketed, 
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reaching an unprecedented $29.5 
billion.117  On the other hand, while 
oil revenues rose consistently follow-
ing the 2003 oil strike, the amount of 
money gained through non-oil exports 
decreased between 2005 and 2006.118   
Data compiled in 2009 shows that Vene-
zuela’s non-oil sector continued in this 
downward trend, shrinking by about 5 per-
cent annually over the past three years.119 
 With the value of oil being less than 
one-third of its value at the peak of the oil 
boom, Dutch Disease stands out as a particu-
lar threat to stability in Venezuela.  Similar 
to problems faced by administrations under 
puntofijismo, Chávez has been unable to 
provide Venezuelans with sustainable 
jobs.120 Chávez’s Vuelvan Caras mission 
attempts to create jobs and expand the non-
oil sector by assisting Venezuelans in setting 
up cooperatives.  However, this mission is 
not enough to create long-term jobs and no-
tably expand the non-oil sector as many co-
operatives fail shortly after the government 
stops providing them with resources.121 Fur-
thermore, Chávez’s decision to set an over-
valued fixed exchange rate of 2.15 bolívares 
to the dollar has contributed to high inflation 
in recent years, reinforcing Dutch disease 
trends by making imports artificially cheap 
while exports become more expensive and 
less competitive in global markets.122 
 To stave off the effects of Dutch dis-
ease, Chávez must find a way to broaden his 
government’s sources of revenue so that it is 
less dependent on oil revenues which could 
be done by increasing non-oil taxes.  Ac-
cording to Venezuela expert Terry Lynn 
Karl, ever since the Hydrocarbons Law of 
1943, which increased taxes on oil compa-
nies so that profits would be split “fifty-
fifty” between the companies and the gov-
ernment, there has been “a permanent temp-
tation to cut into the profits of foreign com-
panies as a means of sustaining oil-
subsidized activities while avoiding the taxa-
tion of domestic groups.”123  Failure to ade-
quately collect non-oil taxes proved to be a 
major downfall of the Punto Fijo system 
which, between 1977 and 1979, was receiv-
ing 70.3 percent of Venezuelan tax revenues 
from corporate income taxes, primarily from 
oil companies.124 Chávez appears to recog-
nize that this was a major weakness of pun-
tofijismo and he, consequently, announced 
along with his 2009 budget cuts his plan to 
increase sales taxes in Venezuela as well.125  
The increase will allow Chávez to diversify 
his sources of government revenue so that it 
may be less dependent on unpredictable oil 
revenues. 
 The fall of puntofijismo was also due 
in large part to ill handling of the absorption 
problem by Venezuelan presidents during 
the oil booms between 1960 and 1980.  Un-
der this system, oil revenues were spent irre-
sponsibly as military loyalty was largely 
purchased through incentives, corrupt lead-
ers mismanaged funds, and the government 
spent a significant amount of money on so-
cial programs, whether or not they proved to 
be effective.126 The Venezuelan government, 
thus, spent large amounts of money to fund 
its policies during this period, yet it was re-
lying primarily on oil revenues to do so.  
When the second oil boom ended in the 
1980s, rather than implement more taxes in 
Venezuela, presidents opted to borrow 
money internationally and artificially control 
the bolívar’s exchange rate, causing debt to 
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accumulate and reinforcing symp-
toms of Dutch disease.127     
 Chávez’s foreign policy is a 
testament to his unwise use of govern-
ment funds to finance often ineffective 
policies and, as he spends that money, he 
is replicating many of the mistakes made 
under the Punto Fijo system.  Similar to 
presidents under the Punto Fijo system who 
purchased new arms as incentives for the 
military, Chávez has committed billions of 
dollars to upgrading Venezuela’s military.  
As previously discussed, Chávez has made 
multiple major weapons purchases from sev-
eral countries, agreeing to buy over $4.4 bil-
lion worth of weapons from Russia alone.128  
Furthermore, as discussed throughout the first 
section, Chávez has also spent billions of dol-
lars on aid and development projects through-
out Latin America, despite evidence that his 
regional foreign policy has had only limited 
success in achieving his goals.  Chávez has 
spent billions of dollars on capital-intensive 
programs and projects that depend on oil 
revenues, including an estimated $12 billion 
on “oil assistance handouts” last year 
alone.129The fact that Chávez has committed 
such large sums of Venezuelan money to 
fund various policies around Latin America 
shows that, like other petro-states, the high 
revenues from oil exports have given him a 
sense of economic stability, and even infalli-
bility.  Empowered by the influx of oil reve-
nues, he has pursued a variety of costly poli-
cies to further several goals that were only 
indirectly related to benefiting Venezuela’s 
population, such as encouraging Latin Ameri-
can countries to break away from western-
based IFIs.  
 Furthermore, Chávez’s missions, 
which are comparable to social programs im-
plemented during the Punto Fijo era, have 
been one of his largest expenditures, requir-
ing billions of dollars to finance, yet their 
success has been debatable.  As previously 
mentioned, the Vuelvan Caras mission has 
only had limited success in creating success-
ful cooperatives and sustainable jobs in 
Venezuela.  It is doubtful that the Robinson 
mission (which aims to educate Venezuela’s 
rural population) actually succeeded in teach-
ing 1.5 million Venezuelan adults to read and 
write as Chávez claims it did, however even 
if they did reach this goal, it came at a high 
price as the government spent $50 million to 
fund the mission.130 This equates to about 
$536 per adult that successfully became liter-
ate through this program, a very high cost 
when compared to the average per pupil cost 
of $47 in Sub-Saharan Africa, $30 in Asia, 
and $61 in Latin America.131 The Barrio 
Adentro mission, which was previously dis-
cussed, is also very costly for Venezuela, as 
in addition to supplying Cuba with fuel, it 
involves transporting patients to and from 
Cuba if medical treatments are not available 
in Venezuela.The operating budget for this 
mission is $5 billion each year.132 These are 
only three of Chávez’s missions, yet as we 
can see, they are very expensive social pro-
grams with only a limited rate of success. 
 The fact that Chávez has borrowed 
money in recent years to help fund his poli-
cies could be somewhat alarming for Vene-
zuela now that the oil prices have decreased 
so much.  Taking out loans during an oil 
boom can be particularly troublesome for 
petro-states.  As long as oil prices remain 
high, banks are willing to lend these states 
money, however when the value of oil  
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decreases, banks become unwilling 
to continue lending and petro-states 
must quickly pay back their loans at a 
time when less oil revenues are coming 
in.  Nigeria became an infamous exam-
ple of a petro-state failing as a result of 
this pattern as it borrowed large amounts of 
money during a 1980s oil boom to fund ex-
pensive, wasteful projects, and then found 
itself in debt and unable to adjust to the sud-
den plunge of oil prices in 1986.133 Loans 
also deepened the financial troubles of Vene-
zuela under the Punto Fijo system as the later 
administrations, reluctant to raise non-oil 
taxes, took out loans which led the country 
further into debt.134 
 Throughout Chávez’s presidency, 
Venezuela’s external debt rose from about 
$27.9 billion when he was elected in 1998 to 
a peak about $47.1 billion in the second half 
of 2005 (see Table 2).  Following this peak, 
Venezuelan debt steadily decreased, however 
the C.I.A. World Factbook reports that in 
2008, external debt increased to nearly $48 
billion as Chávez has taken out several new 
loans.135 For example, in February 2008, 
China agreed to furnish Venezuela with a $4 
billion loan which Venezuela is to pay back 
in shipments of refined oil, rather than in 
cash.136   In September 2008, Russia also 
agreed to loan Venezuela $1 billion to help 
Chávez fund his massive arms purchases.137  
Yet, despite the fifty percent increase from 
the 1998 figure in dollar amounts, at its cur-
rent rate, debt is unlikely to cause economic 
instability in Venezuela as it did in Nigeria 
because it represents only 14.7 percent of 
Venezuela’s GDP, a manageable percentage, 
particularly when compared to other coun-
tries. 138 Although oil prices are currently at 
about $48 per barrel, unlike Nigeria and the 
Punto Fijo administrations, Chávez has a sig-
nificant amount of money saved in interna-
tional reserves to temporarily supplement the 
oil revenue that Venezuela is able to generate 
during this oil bust.139 
 Analysis of Chávez’s mismanage-
ment of oil revenues with relation to the 
common trends of the petro-state curse raises 
the question of how long Venezuela can sus-
tain itself through this oil bust.  This analysis 
shows that his economic policies have repli-
cated several common weaknesses that have 
led other petro-states to the point of eco-
nomic collapse.  Norway has been one of the 
most successful petro-states, in large part due 
to its Government Pension Fund—Global 
(formerly the Government Petroleum Fund) 
which is a stabilization fund established in 
1990 to help offset the effects of future de-
clines in the value of oil.140 Venezuela also 
has a stabilization fund, known as the Fund 
for Macroeconomic Stabilization, though it is 
only valued at about $800 million compared 
with Norway’s fund which is worth about 
$326 billion.141 Venezuela’s international 
reserve savings may insulate the country 
from some of the effects of the oil price drop, 
however these reserves can only prevent the 
economic decline for a limited amount of 
time.  Chávez will need to make wise adjust-
ments to his budget in order to avert com-
plete destabilization in Venezuela as a result 
of the petro-state curse.  
To prevent the absorption problem 
from rapidly destabilizing Venezuela’s 
economy without squandering its savings, 
Chávez must look carefully at each of his 
policies, evaluate their effectiveness, then 
improve the efficiency of those that are  
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crucial and eliminate those that are 
not absolutely necessary.  As re-
vealed through analysis in the first 
two sections of the paper, Chávez’s 
policies throughout the region have 
only earned him conditional support for 
his ambitions and they have not achieved 
his intended goals.  For example, Chávez’s 
missions need to be reconsidered too as their 
effectiveness has been severely limited as 
demonstrated by the Vuelvan Caras, Barrio 
Adentro, and Robinson missions.  These 
types of ineffective policies and programs 
must be changed or eliminated so that 
Chávez is not squandering Venezuelan 
funds. 
By expanding the government’s 
sources of non-oil revenue and altering or 
eliminating ineffective policies, Chávez will 
be able to forestall economic collapse in 
Venezuela, however he will not be able to 
prevent economic decline completely.  With 
regards to Venezuela’s current situation, 
Karl stated, “Regardless of intentions no 
[previous] regime has been able to manage 
these booms to overcome poverty.  The end 
result is the shortages, inflation and slowing 
of economic growth that we’re seeing 
now.”142 Venezuela is likely to face balance 
of payment problems with its high imports 
and lower revenues.  Its inflation rate is cur-
rently the highest in Latin America at 30.7 
percent, and economic growth has slowed 
significantly.143 Indeed, if oil prices do not 
continue to rise as they have been since the 
middle of February (see Figure 1), then 
Venezuela could be slated for economic in-
stability within several months.  However, 
throughout 2009, Venezuela is likely to fore-
stall economic collapse as long as Chávez 
handles government funds responsibly.  Un-
fortunately, Venezuela does not have ade-
quate funds to avoid economic decline if the 
oil bust lasts several years and any policy 
changes that are made may come at the ex-
pense of some of Latin America’s most im-
poverished countries. 
Changes to Chávez’s Latin American For-
eign Policy: 
 The threat of economic and political 
instability resulting from decreased oil reve-
nues will force Chávez to focus on improv-
ing conditions within Venezuela, especially 
after his referendum to eliminate limits on 
the number of terms that elected officials 
can serve passed in February of this year.144  
In making foreign policy decisions, leaders 
are always involved in a “two-level game” 
meaning that their policies must “satisfy si-
multaneously both their domestic audience 
and their counterparts in other countries.”145 
Seeking to win the 2012 presidential elec-
tion in Venezuela and serve a fourth presi-
dential term (including his brief first term 
before his reelection under the Bolivarian 
Constitution), Chávez cannot risk alienating 
his supporters by allowing the oil bust to 
exacerbate Venezuela’s domestic problems.  
As a rational leader, Chávez will be forced 
to reevaluate his policies and programs in 
Latin America to ensure that his political 
actions are effective and directly benefit 
Venezuela, resulting in a turn away from 
Chávez’s current ideological influence and 
goals in the region. 
First of all, many of Chávez’s pro-
grams and agreements that offer cheap 
loans, credit, and oil to countries around the 
region will be among those policies that he 
will have to alter or eliminate.  Given the 
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cost of maintaining such programs 
compared with their effectiveness in 
achieving his goals, Chávez will have 
to make budget cuts and improvements 
to these agreements to keep from over-
spending Venezuela’s limited revenue.  In 
January of this year, Chávez already altered 
Petrocaribe, which is one of the most impor-
tant agreements he has reached in Latin 
America.  When the agreement was first 
signed in 2005, countries purchasing oil 
through Petrocaribe only had to pay for forty 
percent of the oil up front, and then pay the 
difference over the next 25 years at an inter-
est rate of one percent.  With significantly 
lower oil prices, the conditions of the agree-
ment now require that countries pay fifty 
percent of the cost of oil up front.146  Chávez 
will inevitably have to make many similar 
adjustments to his policies around the re-
gion, for example by limiting funding for 
development in other countries. 
Furthermore, Chávez’s large-scale 
energy integration plans will have to be put 
on hold as long as the price of oil remains 
low.  With oil worth less than one-third of 
its value at the peak of the price boom and 
Chávez needing to keep his Venezuelan con-
stituency content to win the 2012 election, 
he will be unable to fund the numerous large
-scale projects, such as refineries and pipe-
lines, that he has promised to help build in 
neighboring countries.  As of January 2009, 
Chávez was already reconsidering his coun-
try’s ability to fund the development of oil 
refineries that had been planned for Nicara-
gua and Ecuador.147 Although he has at-
tempted to give the impression that such 
projects will still be carried out as promised, 
Venezuela currently lacks the extra funds 
that are necessary to fulfill Chávez’s prom-
ises.  Therefore, it is unlikely that much pro-
gress will be made toward the completion of 
these large-scale energy infrastructure pro-
jects throughout Latin America because the 
oil bust will force Chávez to prioritize Vene-
zuela’s domestic affairs. 
 The result of these budget adjust-
ments will be a reverse of Chávez’s foreign 
policy goals of establishing Venezuela as a 
strong regional power and minimizing west-
ern influence in Latin America.  Throughout 
Chávez’s presidency, most Latin American 
leaders have attempted to balance their rela-
tions between Venezuela and the United 
States.  However, with Venezuela’s econ-
omy lacking the strength to continue the 
very policies that have won Chávez condi-
tional support throughout the region, Latin 
American leaders are likely to move closer 
to the United States and other western coun-
tries which tend to be more stable than de-
veloping countries like Venezuela.  Figure 2 
shows that the amount of IFI loans being 
taken in Latin America increased signifi-
cantly in 2008 when the global financial cri-
sis began and this trend is likely to continue 
through 2009 as the crisis worsens.  Latin 
American countries including Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Jamaica, Colombia, and Mexico 
are all beginning to take out new IFI loans in 
light of the economic crisis.148 Ecuador, too, 
which maintains good relations with 
Chávez, is looking to take out $2.6 billion in 
credits which Correa would prefer to receive 
from regional multilateral lenders including 
the Inter-American Development Bank, the 
Andean Development Corporation, and the 
Latin American Reserve Fund.149  Given the 
fragile state of the world economy, even 
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countries that maintain amicable 
relations with Chávez are likely to 
pursue policies that improve their re-
lations with the West in order to en-
courage foreign investment along with 
other incentives that could come from 
maintaining good relations, such as aid.   
Chávez’s foreign policy budget cuts 
will most hurt the impoverished Latin 
American countries that have become de-
pendent on Chávez’s policies, pushing many 
of them closer to the West as well.  For ex-
ample, the ten percent increase of money 
Petrocaribe countries must pay up front for 
oil may affect the amount of oil that some of 
the poorer Caribbean countries can afford to 
buy and it is very possible that Chávez will 
be forced to alter the agreement even more.  
Although it is likely that Chávez will con-
tinue Petrocaribe, the countries of the Carib-
bean will continue to maintain strong rela-
tions with the United States as it provides 
them with necessary aid.  Cuba and Bolivia 
have become particularly dependent on 
Chávez’s assistance to their countries.  
Chávez is likely to continue the oil for medi-
cal care exchange that is set up by the Barrio 
Adentro mission between Cuba and Vene-
zuela because it brings direct benefit to 
Venezuelans in the form of health care.  
However, Chávez still may be forced to limit 
the amount of oil sent to Cuba and the free 
medical services that Venezuelans are pro-
vided if Venezuela’s economy becomes too 
weak.  Bolivia, on the other hand, is likely to 
suffer heavily from budget cuts that Chávez 
will be forced to make as the country is al-
ready extremely dependent on foreign assis-
tance and Morales has opted to receive aid 
and loans from Venezuela over the West 
when he could.  As a result, he has accumu-
lated over $100 million in debt to Venezuela 
that Bolivia will be unable to pay back in the 
near future if Chávez finds that he needs 
those funds.150  With the global economic 
situation worsening, if Venezuela loses the 
financial strength to continue its aid and pro-
grams in the country, then Morales will be 
forced to pursue policies that are in accor-
dance with western interests because Bolivia 
is dependent on foreign aid that industrial-
ized western countries will most likely be 
able to provide. 
 Given Venezuela’s economic fragil-
ity due to the oil bust, Chávez himself may 
be forced to pursue improved relations with 
the United States.  Similar to Chávez’s first 
year in office when financial mismanage-
ment under the Punto Fijo system left Vene-
zuela’s economy weak, the oil bust has led 
Venezuela to once again face many of the 
same economic problems today that it faced 
then, including “recession, confronted infla-
tion, capital flight, and low oil prices.”151  In 
a move that reflects his recognition of the 
fragile state of Venezuela’s economy in this 
post-oil boom period, Chávez invited west-
ern oil companies to make oil bids on Vene-
zuela’s oil reserves in January of this year.152  
This suggests that Chávez will once again 
pursue better relations with the West, includ-
ing the United States, in order to attract for-
eign revenue. 
Although increased foreign invest-
ment in Venezuela’s oil industry would be 
beneficial in maximizing its oil production, 
the necessity to improve relations with the 
United States would limit Chávez’s ability 
to act definitively against American interests 
and to influence neighboring countries to 
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do the same. Furthermore, it is very 
likely that western companies will 
be wary of investing in Venezuela 
given his actions to remove foreign in-
vestors from Venezuela’s oil industry 
and consolidate government control over 
PdVSA.  Foreign investors may fear that 
when oil prices rise, Chávez will once again 
attempt to regain control over their oil fields.  
Due to concern over Chávez’s past actions, 
foreign oil companies may look toward other 
oil fields to invest in, such as those that were 
recently discovered in Brazil.  As such, in-
viting foreign investment in Venezuela’s oil 
industry would greatly limit Chávez’s free-
dom to pursue his policies, especially as he 
will need to find a way to regain the trust of 
foreign investors so that they feel that Vene-
zuelan oil is a worthwhile investment. 
 
Conclusion: 
As we have seen, Chávez has fallen 
into the same petro-state trap that led to the 
downfall of puntofijismo and other petro-
state administrations around the world by 
attempting to capitalize off of an oil boom 
by using the money to fund lavish and 
wasteful policies throughout Latin America.  
Despite saving $42.2 billion in international 
reserves, his management of Venezuela’s oil 
wealth shows little foresight for the price 
plunge that inevitably followed the sudden 
oil boom.  Oil prices are constantly fluctuat-
ing, therefore large oil booms are always 
accompanied by price busts that history 
shows can have devastating effects on a 
petro-state if the government does not ade-
quately plan for such market changes.  The 
oil bust of 2008 was particularly sudden and 
drastic, however petro-states must do their 
best to prepare for such sudden changes in 
oil prices.  Analysis of Hugo Chávez’s for-
eign policy throughout the boom-and-bust 
cycle of oil prices offers many lessons that 
should be noted by other petro-state leaders 
who face the challenges that accompany 
natural resource management, particularly 
when that resource is the country’s primary 
source of revenue. 
First of all, petro-state leaders must 
understand that increased revenues from an 
oil boom do not make an oil-dependent 
country rich, because oil prices can plunge 
as quickly as they rise.  Chávez’s foreign 
policy serves as an example of what petro-
state leaders should avoid in managing their 
budget during an oil boom.  Chávez spent 
much of Venezuela’s oil revenues on costly 
programs throughout Latin America that did 
not directly benefit Venezuela in the long-
term and, furthermore, were ineffective in 
accomplishing the goals that they set out to 
achieve.  This is not to say that petro-states 
must completely neglect foreign policy, but 
rather they should prioritize domestic affairs 
and pursue only policies that will further the 
primary goals of their country.  For example, 
Chávez’s Barrio Adentro mission provides 
Venezuelans with health care, an important 
service that was lacking for most Venezue-
lans prior to the mission’s creation, therefore 
it is a program worth pursuing through 
Venezuelan foreign policy.  However, the 
program is currently expensive and ineffi-
cient due to the large oil shipments and the 
range of medical treatments that are offered 
to Venezuelans.  As such, it is likely to un-
dergo changes, for example, by decreasing 
the amount of oil that is shipped and offer-
ing fewer medical services, which would 
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make the program more efficient 
and economically sustainable.  As 
long as such policies and programs 
are cost-effective, efficient, and geared 
toward the direct, long-term benefit of 
the public (for example, through coupling 
such a program with an educational ex     
change program to train domestic workers), 
then they may be worth pursuing by petro-
state governments. 
Furthermore, petro-states must not 
chase away foreign investment in the oil in-
dustry as large, experienced oil companies 
have proven to be most effective in ensuring 
peak oil production.  Chávez’s decision to 
consolidate government control over PdVSA 
in 2003 proved to be one of the greatest mis-
takes of his presidency as Venezuelan oil pro-
duction dropped by about 800,000 barrels of 
oil per day (see Figure 3).  Venezuela has un-
doubtedly lost billions of dollars in potential 
oil revenues that could have provided Vene-
zuela with more money and jobs throughout 
the oil boom.  Furthermore, if oil production 
were at its peak in Venezuela, then the coun-
try would be bringing in more revenues now 
that oil prices are low.  For petro-state leaders, 
the easiest policy option may appear to be 
heavy taxation of the oil industry, or even 
complete control of it to increase the govern-
ment’s budget, and low taxation of other sec-
tors to please the population.153  However, 
foreign investment is key to maintaining the 
upkeep of a country’s oil infrastructure and 
keeping its oil industry at peak production.  
Petro-states must, therefore, allow at least 
some foreign investment in their oil industry 
and also diversify their sources of revenue by 
promoting and taxing non-oil sectors of the 
economy. 
 Finally, it is essential that petro-state 
leaders exercise great prudence by saving 
large amounts of money to offset the detri-
mental effects of future oil busts.  The $42.2 
billion that Chávez managed to save may help 
Venezuela get through this year, however it is 
little compared to the $326 billion that Nor-
way has saved in its Government Pension 
Fund.154  Due to resource depletion, petro-
states must maintain very high rates of sav-
ings and investment throughout oil booms to 
generate real wealth and to secure economic 
stability in the event of an oil bust.155  Norway 
has been one of the most stable petro-states in 
the world due to responsible management of 
its revenues.  As such, other petro-states 
should follow Norway’s lead in establishing a 
strong stabilization fund that is not to be 
touched unless their economic situation re-
quires it.  Many petro-states are beginning to 
set aside large portions of their resource reve-
nues to create stabilization funds, including 
Russia, Brazil, and even Libya.156  Chávez, on 
the other hand, has not invested heavily in 
Venezuela’s stabilization fund, choosing in-
stead to squander large amounts of oil reve-
nues through his costly foreign policy.  Other 
petro-state leaders can, thus, learn from his 
mistake. 
Unfortunately, in the case of Vene-
zuela, Chávez’s management of oil revenues 
throughout the oil boom-and-bust cycle has 
made his country susceptible to economic de-
cline as a result of the oil curse.  If oil prices 
remain low or drop even further, Venezuela’s 
economy will quickly destabilize due to 
Chávez’s decision to spend more money im-
mediately and to save less for an emergency.  
Furthermore, his wasteful spending will 
negatively impact poor Latin American 
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countries that have come to depend 
on his foreign policy.  However, 
through the combination of wise ad-
justments to Venezuela’s budget and 
luck in the form of rising oil prices, 
Chávez may have the chance to learn 
from his mistakes and prepare Venezuela to 
be secure in the event of a future oil bust.  It 
is important, then, that he and other petro-
state leaders, both present and future, under-
stand the mistakes that allowed Venezuela to 
quickly transform from an economically se-
cure country that was purchasing allies and 
regional influence into a country that runs 
the great risk of suffering from economic 
instability.  In order to promote the eco-
nomic security of their countries throughout 
the duration of the oil boom-and-bust cycle, 
petro-state leaders must refrain from waste-
fully spending oil revenues on immediate 
projects, and instead encourage foreign in-
vestment and a diversified source of reve-
nue, and save large amounts of money to 
ensure economic security despite the unpre-
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Figure 1: Weekly Prices of  













This graph shows the weekly prices of Venezuelan crude oil between January 1978 and March 2009.  Prices from 
the recent oil boom hit their peak in July 2008 at a price of $137.98 per barrel and they have declined dramatically 
since then. U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Weekly Venezuela Tia Juana Light Spot Price FOB,” Offi-
cial Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government (Washington D.C.: April 29, 2009). 
 
Table 1: Evaluation of Leaders, 2005-2008 
 
Q92ST. I’m going to list a number of foreign leaders. I want you to evaluate them on a scale from 0 to 10, where 
0 means a “very bad” evaluation and 10 means “very good”. Or do you not know enough to give an opinion? 
Source: Latinobarómetro 2008 
  2005 2006 2007 2008       
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 5.8 5.6 5.6 5.9 
King Juan Carlos I 5.8 5.9 5.9 5.7 
José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.5 
Michelle Bachelet   5.4 5.4 5.5 
Fernando Lugo       5.5 
Álvaro Uribe   4.9 4.9 5.2 
Rafael Correa     4.7 5.0 
Felipe Calderón     5.0 5.0 
Tabaré Vásquez   4.6 4.6 5.0 
Evo Morales   4.9 4.9 4.8 
Cristina Kirchner       4.7 
Alan García   4.6 4.6 4.3 
Hugo Chávez 4.9 4.5 4.5 4.3 
Fidel Castro 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.2 
George W. Bush 4.9 4.7 4.5 4.2 
Daniel Ortega       4.0 
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This graph shows the amount of money being loaned to Latin America and the Caribbean by the Andean Devel-
opment Corporation (CAF), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) each year be-
tween 1997 and 2008.  The amount of loans furnished by the western-based IFIs, the World Bank and the IDB, 
was down significantly until about 2006 from their peak in the late 1990s, while the amount of loans from the 
CAF was increasing since 1999.  However, as illustrated in the graph, between 2007 and 2008, loans from all 
three IFIs increased significantly. 
Source: Center for International Policy 
Vince McElhiny, “Global Crisis is Good News for IFIs in Latin America,” Americas Program Report. 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy, January 27, 2009). 
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This graph illustrates the varying trends of Venezuela’s oil production and consumption between 1987 and 2007.  
In 2007, Venezuela only produced about 2.7 million barrels of oil, significantly down from the approximately 3.5 
million barrels of oil that the country was producing around 1997. 
U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Venezuela: Oil,” Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government 
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